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Introduction
“All truth passes through three stages. First it is ridiculed. 
Second it is violently opposed. Th   ird it is accepted as self-
evident. ” [1]
Arthur Schopenhauer 1788–1860
It is estimated that approximately 40,000–100,000 
Americans die annually from medical errors [2]. 
Th  ousands more suﬀ  er harm from medical errors. Still 
others are exposed to errors, but are lucky enough to 
suﬀ  er no obvious harm [3]. In fact, medical errors are 
now the eighth leading cause of death in the USA; data 
are no less alarming from other nations [4]. Regardless of 
the exact ﬁ  gures, it seems that patient safety is far from 
adequate. Crudely put, if medicine were a patient, we 
physicians would say it is time to admit there is a 
problem. We would expect urgent action, and we would 
welcome any ideas, rather than tolerate further delays. 
Th  is chapter hopes to provide a call-to-arms, but most 
importantly a range of ideas, both new and old, to achieve 
the sort of care that our patients deserve.
‘The missing curriculum’ [3]
Albert Einstein stated that: “you can never solve a 
problem by using the same thinking that created it” [5]. 
As such, the ﬁ  rst step is to emphasize that medical errors 
are rarely merely negligence, sloppiness, incompetence, 
or poor motivation. Instead, we should accept that 
health  care is amongst the world’s most complex social 
systems [3]. Coupled with the complexity of medical 
diagnosis, and the need to make decisions despite time 
pressure and incomplete information, the shocking 
patient safety ﬁ   gures make more sense. Perhaps the 
complexity of the task ahead is also a little clearer.
Th  e slogan states “Safety is no accident” [3]; stated 
another way, errors in healthcare are rarely random, 
unpredictable events. Some errors may ultimately be 
rooted in our organizations and perpetuated by our 
traditions. Like many complex systems, medicine has a 
double-headed Janus [6], where these traditions are both 
our greatest asset and our keenest shortfall. For example, 
the laudable tradition of self-reliance and patient-
ownership means that physicians usually stay until the 
work is done, and diligently follow patients from admis-
sion to discharge. However, downsides include the 
dangerous eﬀ  ects of fatigue, and a reluctance to permit 
input from others. It has also created a system where we 
appreciate that errors occur, just not at a personal level! 
Centuries of pedagogy also mean we have been slow to 
implement innovative methods of training. For example, 
despite functioning in multi-professional teams that 
require nuanced coordination and communication skills, 
these skills are rarely deliberately taught, or sought after 
from applicants [7]. Our traditions also mean that while 
medical graduates are versed in the science of medicine, 
and acquire skills to look after individual patients, few are 
trained to tackle systemic safety issues, or to understand 
how humans work in large groups or complex systems. 
One way to do so is to be open to innovative ideas, 
regardless of their source (Table 1). Another is to change 
the very way we regard our work.
Engineering and acute care medicine
A favorite debate is whether medicine is more ‘science’ or 
‘art’. However, safe patient care could instead be 
understood as ‘engineering’. After all, engineering means 
“applying the best current technical, scientiﬁ  c, and other 
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devices, systems, and processes to safely realize an 
objective” [8]. Commercial aviation is far from perfect, 
and there are diﬀ  erences between scheduled ﬂ  ights and 
unscheduled medical crises. However, aviation has 
achieved a log reduction in fatalities. Th  is has been 
largely accomplished by applying engineering principles. 
In fact, there is now 1 fatal crash per 4.5 million take oﬀ  s, 
and the most dangerous part of many a pilot’s day is the 
airport commute, rather than the subsequent ﬂ  ight [9]. 
Th   e same cannot be said for patients entering a hospital. 
An engineering approach would also mandate Standard 
Operating Procedures (such as protocols and check lists) 
and implement redundancies (such as double-checks, 
fail-safes, and time-outs). Engineering theory also means 
accepting that the complexity of the system exceeds the 
ability of any one individual. Th  is means encouraging 
second-opinions and practicing teamwork [3]. Engineer-
ing also means accepting continuous updates, and 
utilizing the best current information, even if imperfect 
(i.e. “a good solution now is better than a perfect solution 
later”). In contrast, with our current medical model, 
imperfect research oﬀ  ers an excuse not to change. With 
an engineering model, near misses also represent an 
opportunity to improve the system, especially if freely 
discussed, and especially if all are permitted to contribute 
and learn. An open approach fosters a sense of respon-
sibility and empowerment, rather than resignation.
Th  e goal of aviation is safe, eﬃ   cient, and predictable 
travel from point A to B. Th   ere is no reason why medicine 
should not similarly promote safe, eﬃ   cient, and predic-
table care from A to D (admission to discharge). Aviation 
passengers do not mind if pilots divide their task into 
take-oﬀ  , ﬂ  ight, and landing. It does patients no disservice 
if healthcare workers similarly divide hospital care into 
input, throughout, and output. Furthermore, seeing 
ourselves as ‘product safety engineers’ redeﬁ  nes our role 
to that of coordinating the safe transit of a patient 
through the system, rather than making us responsible 
for making every minor decision, or performing every 
minor treatment.
Engineering and error prevention
Using the engineering model, errors are better concep-
tua  lized using a system model [7, 10]. For example, in a 
typical commercial airline crash, there might be a 
technical problem, but this alone is rarely enough to 
cause a crash. Th  e crew might also be tired, such that 
decision-making skills erode, and things are missed that 
would otherwise not be. Th  e plane might be behind 
schedule, adding stress and a reluctance to invest the 
extra time for safety. In addition, many crews have not 
ﬂ  own together, so are unfamiliar with each other’s style. 
Th  e sum total of these minor stresses is a team that is 
‘maxed out’, with nothing left if adversity strikes. Most of 
the time they will be lucky. Some of the time they will not.
An old proverb states that “failing to plan” is “planning 
to fail” [11]. Th  is is why engineers and pilots also talk 
about enhancing situational awareness [12, 13]. Th  is is 
because identifying a discrepancy between what is 
happening and what should be happening is often the 
ﬁ  rst indication of an error. Enhanced situational aware-
ness promotes a proactive, rather than reactive, approach. 
Pilots talk about “ﬂ  ying ahead of the plane”, because they 
realize optimal crisis management begins before a crisis 
erupts. Regardless, defenses against error include perso  n  nel, 
technology, training, and administration [3, 7]. However, 
most important is culture: Th  e collective attitudes, 
beliefs, and values [3]. Ideally, the combined layers of 
defense are impermeable. In reality, there are weaknesses 
and the layers are – to borrow another analogy from 
engineering – like slices of Swiss-cheese that contain 
holes. Fortunately, because there are multiple layers, 
single errors (i.e., a single hole) do not normally cause a 
bad outcome. In contrast when mishaps occur, the holes 
have lined up, at least momentarily [3]. Th  is is why a 
minor technical problem, fatigue, or time pressure alone, 
would rarely cause a disaster, but when combined they 
can. In fact, when errors are dissected (whether following 
plane crashes, power station meltdowns, or medical 
mishaps) it is typical to ﬁ  nd three or more minor issues 
resulting in one major error [3].
When an adverse event occurs, a system-approach 
means that corrective eﬀ  orts should focus less on who, 
and more on how did it happen, why did the defenses fail, 
and what can be done to prevent it happening in future. 
Th  is contrasts with the traditional medical approach 
where the focus is on assigning responsibility (so called 
‘name, blame, shame’). Traditional eﬀ  orts to reduce error, 
Table 1. Insights for acute care medicine from diverse 
sources
Example Insight
Engineering  Most errors are neither random nor unpredictable
  Benefi  ts of Standard Operating Procedures
  Usefulness of second-opinions; fail-safes; time-outs
  Benefi  ts of a systems approach to error and education
  Apply the Swiss-cheese model to understanding error
Cognitive  Benefi  ts and detriments of:
Psychology    Gestalt, Law of Prägnanz,
    premature closure; availability and anchoring 
   heuristics
Human/Machine  Humans excel at pattern-recognition;
Interface  Computers excel at calculation and vigilance
  The best system mitigates shortcomings
Chess  Need to concurrently manage multiple threats
  Two patterns of attention: Focus of predator; gaze of 
 prey
  Benefi  ts of risk-free simulation
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retraining, but ignore the context in which the error 
occurred [3]. Th  is is also why they are less likely to 
prevent recurrence [12, 13].
Understanding the basics of human error
Th  e most common reason for commercial aviation to 
crash is human error [9, 12–14]. Th   e same appears to be 
true in acute care medicine [2, 3, 12–14]. Engineering 
therefore incorporates more than just mechanical know-
how. A comprehensive strategy also means teaching situa-
tional awareness, improved communication, appro  priate 
task distribution, and optimal teamwork [12–14]. Th  is 
skill set, collectively known as Crew Resource Manage-
ment, is widely taught in aviation. In contrast, medicine’s 
Crisis Resource Management is rarely included in the 
standard medical curriculum [12–14]. Physicians, like 
engineers, should also be taught the basics of why errors 
occur if we are ever to mitigate them. What follows is a 
very basic introduction to the ﬁ  eld of cognitive psychology.
Th   e ‘Gestalt eﬀ  ect’ is the tendency to recognize objects 
or patterns instead of, for example, only seeing lines or 
curves [15, 16]. To pattern-recognize is an essential part 
of our ability, and one of our greatest sources of insight 
[12, 14]. Th   e ability to see connections between seemingly 
disparate information enables our cleverest diagnoses, 
and most innovative thought. A simple example of 
pattern-recognition is the way we are able to recognize 
that an aging male with chest discomfort, breathlessness, 
and arm pain likely has an acute coronary syndrome. 
Early clinical training is all about pattern-recognition. 
Later on, we gain suﬃ   cient experience to pattern recog-
nize automatically, almost without thinking. Unfortu-
nately, as with any action that involves decision-making 
with minimal thinking, errors can occur [17].
Pattern-recognition is essential for eﬃ   cient  and 
expeditious medical care, but it requires that we priori-
tize some pieces of information, while downplaying 
others. In other words, when we look ‘here’, we risk 
missing ‘there’. Most medical practitioners are familiar 
with the beneﬁ   ts of Occam’s Razor [18], where we 
appropriately assume the most common explanation to 
be correct. However, we are less familiar with the detri-
ments of the Law of Prägnanz, where we also subcon-
sciously organize information into the simplest form 
possible [15, 17]. We also search for patterns in order to 
avoid the extra eﬀ  ort required for complex thought or 
calculation. Moreover, we subconsciously process infor-
mation to maintain a sense of order and a feeling of 
competence. We downplay contrary evidence, and are 
reluctant to pursue alternatives (also known as ‘prema-
ture closure’) [16, 17]. We may even judge the likelihood 
by how easily the idea sprang to mind (the so called 
‘availability heuristic’) [17, 19, 20]. We then tend to stick 
with our initial assumptions (the so called ‘anchoring 
heuristic’) [17, 19, 20]. Th   is means that we tend to favor 
diagnoses that we are comfortable treating, overlook 
more serious possibilities, and even favor the excuse that 
it is “not my problem” [17]. Overall, an engineering 
approach means building systems to mitigate cognitive 
errors rather than assuming they result from mere 
arrogance, stupidity, or sloth. For example, cockpits are 
now deliberately conﬁ  gured to have two people operating 
them. Th  is encourages a system where each checks the 
other and oﬀ  ers a second input. We have yet to consider 
the design of acute care areas in similar terms. In the 
meantime, there is no reason why we could not start by 
modifying medical education and training.
Educating for safety
Learning from others could also change how we educate 
[7, 10]. For example, rather than relying upon teachers to 
simply cover their favorite topics, with minimal attention 
to relevance, curricula would be more deliberately 
matched to the goal of safer care. Routine audits would 
establish major problem areas (i.e. common shortfalls or 
steps that require particular precision or the co-
ordination of many people). Results would then be widely 
shared, rather than being the purview of a select few. A 
curriculum would then be drafted (using all relevant 
experts and a modiﬁ   ed-Delphi approach) and alpha-
tested in order to produce a polished product. Next, 
wide-scale dissemination occurs using the optimized 
material (i.e. beta testing) [10]. Th   e process then begins 
again. In this way, educators are not merely passing facts 
from one generation to another, but are in fact running 
the patient safety laboratory (or ‘crash-test site’) for the 
modern hospital [7, 10]. Accordingly, educators become 
important agents of change, and as highly valued as good 
researchers or clinicians.
Maximizing the best of human and machine
As outlined above, modern hospital care mandates an 
understanding of human factors and of technology. 
Th   erefore, understanding this interface is vital. Th  e  1997 
chess match between world champion Garry Kasparov 
and IBM’s Deep Blue oﬀ   ers intriguing insights [21]. 
Kasparov (an example of the human mind) won the ﬁ  rst 
game and Deep Blue (an example of technology) won the 
second. Th  is proves that both are capable of impressive 
performance. However, it is more important to look at 
their respective skills and weaknesses. For example, Deep 
Blue was capable of evaluating 200 million positions per 
second, whereas Kasparov could only evaluate a handful 
and overlooked certain moves when overly focused. As 
outlined above, the inability to pick up on clues in 
medicine is known as a ﬁ  xation error, and is a major source 
of error, even for experienced practitioners [12, 13].
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to emotions. Kasparov had to be nourished and rested. 
Deep Blue also possessed a superior opening and end-
game. Kasparov could think abstractly and plan long-
term strategies. Using pattern recognition, Kasparov 
recognized fragments from previous games in order to 
choose the most appropriate few things upon which to 
focus. When Kasparov won, he did so by maximizing the 
middle game, namely where there are too many pieces 
(variables) on the chessboard for computers to calculate 
all possibilities. When Deep Blue won it was through 
consistency, aided by impeccable memory [21].
Humans excel at pattern recognition. In contrast, we 
are often poor at recognizing, or responding to, gradual 
deterioration. When stressed we are particularly prone to 
tunnel-vision (ignoring additional clues due to excessive 
focus) [12, 13, 17]. We are also weak at calculation (11 x 
24 = ?). Computers are worse at pattern-recognition, but 
excel with calculation and vigilance. Th  e lesson for 
health  care from Kasparov versus Deep Blue is that 
health  care should leverage each in their area of strength: 
Humans to recognize constellations of symptoms, and 
computers to monitor vital-signs and activate a response 
to gradual changes or concerning trends.
Additional insights include how Kasparov and Deep 
Blue’s programmers learnt to mitigate their respective 
weaknesses. For example, Kasparov used computer chess 
engines to objectively analyze positions. Deep Blue’s 
programmers teamed up with chess masters who 
recommended certain strategic moves, based upon their 
collective experience. It could be argued that both man 
and machine were actually ‘cyborgs’: Functional hybrids 
of each other [22]. Regardless, another lesson from 
Kasparov and Deep Blue’s programmers is that 
harnessing the best of the humantechnology hybrid 
created more than the sum of its parts [21, 22]. Similarly, 
we should learn that it is not a battle of human inde  pen-
dence versus technological dominance, but the search for 
synergies in order to achieve excellence. Maximizing the 
best of the human and the technology is the real victory. 
Hopefully the patient will be the ultimate victor.
Other lessons from the chessboard
Engineering and aviation are well known for their use of 
simulation as a key strategy to improve safety. However, 
the game of chess is probably amongst the oldest exam-
ples of simulation, and was likely developed to hone 
military skills [23]. Chess has, therefore, been touted by 
proponents to emphasize that simulation is well-estab-
lished, not an untested departure [23]. It is also remark-
able how this archetype of simulation has other prescient 
lessons for acute care medicine, even 6,000 years on.
Th   e ability to manage concurrent threats is essential in 
chess and in medicine. Interestingly, it is also essential for 
animals throughout nature. Two classic types of attention 
exist [24]. Th  e ﬁ   rst is the predator’s focused-gaze. 
Whether this means a predator moving in for the kill, a 
chess player quickly capturing an opponent’s queen, or a 
physician resuscitating a patient, there is a need to attend 
to only the most pressing issues, ignore less important 
stimuli...and to hopefully know the diﬀ  erence.  Th  e 
second type of attention is less discriminate vigilance. 
Th   is is illustrated by the generalized watchful vigilance of 
prey, the caution shown during chess’s opening moves, or 
the ability to attend to many non-acute issues during 
routine medical moments, such as daily rounds. In this 
case, there is a need to be more open to clues, to watch 
how others react, and to make a more measured response. 
Presumably good chess players, trusted acute care 
clinicians, and even wild animals that live to old age, 
possess both styles; success also means having the 
versatility to switch between the two.
Th  e fact that ‘play’ is so widespread in both humans 
and animals suggests an important role – otherwise 
natural selection would have selected against it as a waste 
of scarce energy. Harmless games, like chess, may be 
beneﬁ   cial precisely because they might result in ‘less 
harm’. Th  ey allow practice in an environment where 
mistakes can be made with minimal consequences for 
those involved. Th  is is presumably why play is so 
common in nature, and also why many medical societies 
now strongly endorse medical simulation [3, 7]. However, 
again compared to other high-risk professions, medicine 
lags far behind [25]. Medical simulation is not yet a 
routine or mandated part of medical training or ongoing 
practice. Increasingly the question is not why should we 
simulate, but rather why do we not?
Conclusion
If we really are serious about designing safer patient care 
for the future, then we should be open to lessons from all 
possible sources. As a result, the modest intent of this 
review was to oﬀ   er insights from the profession of 
engineering, the ﬁ  eld of cognitive psychology, and even 
from games such as chess. Th  e conclusion should be 
obvious – diverse ideas already exist and, therefore, 
medicine need not ‘reinvent the wheel’. However, the 
question, yet to be answered, is whether as a profession 
we have the insight, the will, or the humility. So far, no 
other high-risk industry has waited, or expected the level 
of unequivocal proof, before making changes [25]. Th  at 
change is needed should indeed be “self-evident” [1]. 
Whether the increasing call for change will be “ridiculed” 
or “violently opposed” [1] represents the next stage in the 
evolution of acute care medicine and patient safety.
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